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This paper uses mean and quantile regression analysis to investigate the gender pay gap for the 
wage employed in Vietnam over the period 1993 to 2002. It finds that the Doi moi reforms have 
been associated with a sharp reduction in gender wage disparities for the wage employed. The 
average  gender  pay  gap  in  this  sector  halved  between  1993  and  2002  with  most  of  the 
contraction evident by 1998. There has also been a contraction in the gender pay at most 
selected points of the conditional wage distribution with the observed effect most pronounced at 
the top end of the distribution. However, the decomposition analysis suggests that the treatment 
effect is relatively stable across the conditional wage distribution and little evidence of a ‘glass-
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1.  Introduction 
The process of economic transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has important 
implications for the labour market. The Doi moi reforms have had a major impact on the labour 
market in Vietnam (see Croll, 1998).  The removal of a centrally determined wage system, 
which in the past limited the degree of gender wage inequality, creates potential for a widening 
in the gender pay gap. The reform process has, as in other transitional economies, led to a 
reduction in a variety of public services including support facilities for children. Enterprise 
kindergartens,  schools  and  other  health-care  facilities,  which  were  relatively  commonplace 
under the centrally planned system, have steadily disappeared with the increased emphasis on 
market reform.  
The creation of a private labour market ended the dependence on the state sector as the only 
source of formal employment. Female workers were however found to be more vulnerable in 
the restructuring of the state-owned sector. The reduction from more than 12,000 state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to around 5,500 in the first ten years of the reform process displaced large 
numbers of workers. Women with limited work experience and low educational attainment were 
the  main  victims  of the  early  redundancy  programmes  with about  70%  of  laid-off  workers 
female (Rama, 2001). Beresford (1994) reveals that over half-a-million female workers were 
made redundant from SOEs in 1990-1991. Liu (2004b) suggests that the downsizing in the SOE 
sector  provides  a  potential  channel  through  which  the  gender  pay  gap  could  widen  given 
workers were more formally protected in the SOEs than in the private sector.  
Vietnamese  women  are  accorded  a  wide  range  of  rights  and  privileges  at  work  under  the 
Vietnam Labour Code. Maternity leave is fully paid and time-off during either pregnancy or 
when nursing a child less than twelve months is also regulated.  Female employees are generally 
exempt from a unilateral termination of their contracts during this period (Brassard, 2004). As 
enterprises  have  an  increasing  autonomy  in  managing  business  activities,  including  human 
resources, there may be a tendency for employers to favour male workers and this may result in 
a worsening relative position of women in the labour market.  
In contrast to these potentially more negative impacts of the Doi moi reforms on the female 
position in the labour market, there are also certain improvements evident primarily in terms of 
new employment opportunities for women. The impressive growth over the past fifteen years 
has been partly driven by the exports of light manufacturing, a sector dominated by female 
workers. For instance, the exports of the garment industry account for almost a quarter of total 
manufacturing exports over the past 15 years (GSO, 2005). This sector is one of the major 
employment sources for female workers, including rural female migrants (Thornburn and Jones,   2
2002;  Thornburn,  Ha  and  Hoa,  2002).  Although  the  proportion  of  agricultural  exports  has 
steadily decreased over time, agricultural products still remain a major export commodity. The 
fact that women are more dependent on agriculture than men may suggest that the growth in 
agricultural exports has resulted in more income-generating activities for women.   
Given the foregoing, it is uncertain whether women have been the gainers or losers during 
Vietnam’s transition process. It is not easy to identify the impact of the Doi moi reforms on the 
female  position  in  the  Vietnamese  labour  market.  The  experience  in  other  transitional 
economies tends to suggest a mixed picture. The reduction in female participation was a stylized 
fact  in  the  transitional  economies  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  Russia,  and  other 
countries  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSV)  (see  Allison  and  Ringold,  1996).  However, 
evidence on the gender pay gap has been less clear-cut.  For instance, Newell and Reilly (2001) 
report  that  the  gender  pay  gap  widened  in  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  was  relatively  stable  in 
FRYugoslavia, Slovenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, but fell in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, 
and Hungary.  
The current paper examines the evolution of the gender pay gap for the wage employed in 
Vietnam over the period covering 1993 to 2002.  The primary objective of the current paper is 
to provide some clearer insights on the impact of the reform process on the gender pay gap in 
this sector. Most of the recent literature on gender in Vietnam to date has emphasized the 
negative effects on women of the transition in terms of their access to public services and their 
workforce participation (Gallup, 2002; Brassard, 2004; Long, Le, Truitt, Mai, and Dang, 2000). 
The recent studies of Liu (2004a,b), using data drawn from the household surveys conducted in 
1993 and 1998, arguably provide the first systematic studies on the gender pay gap in Vietnam. 
The contribution of the current paper, however, compared to Liu (op.cit.), is two-fold.  Firstly, 
our analysis focuses on a longer time period given our use of data drawn from a more recent 
survey. Secondly, in contrast to the mean regression approach used by Liu, we enhance the 
analysis by using a quantile regression approach that allows us to explore the gender pay gap at 
selected points of the conditional wage distribution.  In addition, this study offers a modest 
contribution to the empirical literature on the temporal decomposition of the gender pay gap 
using the quantile regression approach by suggesting a very simple decomposition that may 
have application in other contexts.  
The  structure  of  the  paper  can  now  be  outlined.  Section  two provides  a  description  of the 
datasets to be used in investigating the gender pay gap and notes some features on female 
participation,  female  employment,  and  the  gender  pay  gap  using  these  data.  The  empirical 
methodology is detailed in section three. The empirical results are reported in section four, 
which is then followed by a section containing some concluding remarks.    3
 
2.  Data and Overview of the Gender Pay Gap in Vietnam 
2.1  Data 
This paper draws on data from the three household surveys, including the first two rounds of the 
Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (commonly referred as the VLSS 1992/93 and 1997/98) and 
the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (or VHLSS 2002 for short).
1 These surveys 
were conducted by the General Statistic Office (GSO), under the technical assistance of the 
World Bank, with funding from UNDP and Sida. The overall approach used in these surveys is 
compliant  with  the  framework  used  in  the  World  Bank’s  Living  Standard  Measurement 
Surveys.  These  surveys  are  thus  widely  recognized  as  of  high  quality  and  nationally 
representative. 
The VLSS 1992/93 was undertaken using a sample of 4,800 households, of which 4,000 were 
then re-interviewed in the VLSS 1997/98, which comprised a sample of 6,000 households in 
total. Although these surveys have been widely used to explore the impacts of the Doi moi, they 
have been subject to criticism regarding their relatively small sample sizes. This was a primary 
motive for the launch of the second phase of household surveys in 2002 designed to cover the 
2002  –  2010  period.  The  first  survey  of  this  second  phase,  the  VHLSS  2002,  collected 
information  from  a  sample  of  30,000  households.  However,  there  was  no  re-interview  of 
individuals  from  the  original  VLSS  panel  as  the  sampling  frame  for  this  new  phase  was 
substantially different from the earlier period.
2  
The three surveys included two types of questionnaire: (i) household questionnaire; and (ii) 
community  questionnaire.  The  household  questionnaire  covers  a  wide  range  of  information 
from household size and composition, health, education, housing characteristics, employment, 
expenditure  and  food  consumption,  ownership  of  consumer  durables,  and  savings.  The 
community  questionnaires  consist  of  questions  on  basic  physical  and  demographic 
characteristics,  general  economic  conditions  and  economic  activities,  physical  infrastructure 
conditions  and  transportation,  agricultural  production  at  the  communal  level,  as  well  as 
information on schooling and health facilities in each commune (see World Bank, 2000; 2001 
for details). Although the VHLSS 2002 questionnaires were simplified relative to the earlier 
VLSS, the basic content of the survey remained intact and thus allow, for the purpose of the 
                                                 
1 The VLSS 1992/93 dataset was officially released in 1995; the VLSS 1997/98 in 2000; and the VHLSS 
2002 dataset was available for official uses in December 2004. 
2 The VLSS used the 1989 Population Census as the sampling frame, while the VHLSS 2002 used the 
1999 Population and Housing Census.   4
current exercise, construction of a set of variables that are compatible across all three surveys. 
The  next  sub-section  describes  some  stylized  features  of  the  gender  pay  gap  for  the  wage 
employed in Vietnam using data drawn from these three surveys.   
 
2.2  Overview of the Gender Pay Gap in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s labour market is characterized by a high participation rate among both men and 
women. Around 84% of Vietnamese men and 82% of women aged 15 to 60 were working in the 
1993-2002 period (see table 1). In rural areas, the gender-specific participation rates are even 
higher. These high participation rates are comparable with the experience of the former Soviet 
Union  and  other  CEE  centrally  planned  economies  prior  to  the  transition.  However,  the 
relatively stable participation rates for female workers in Vietnam is in contrast to these other 
countries, where the contraction in participation was relatively large during the transition period 
(Newell and Reilly, 2001). 
One million new entrants have entered the labour force in Vietnam per annum between 1993 
and  2002.  The  rising  trend  in  the  unemployment  rate  suggests  that  the  impressive  growth 
associated with the reforms has not been sufficient to absorb the fast growing labour force. As a 
result, unemployment, defined as those in the labour force and actively looking for work, has 
steadily risen over the 1993-2002 period. The unemployment rate nearly doubled from roughly 
4.4% in 1993 to 8.4% in 2002. On average, the male unemployment rate was two percentage 
points higher than the female rate. One explanation for this gender differential could be the 
rapid growth of female worker-intensive exports such as garments, footwear, and agricultural 
products over the past decade.  
Table 1 also reveals some notable features regarding Vietnam’s labour market dynamics over 
the 1993-2002 period. Off-farm employment has become an increasingly important activity. On 
average, the employment share in agriculture has fallen by roughly one-fifth for both male and 
female workers. Most of this decrease in agricultural employment was absorbed by the wage 
employment sector. Given that wage employment is generally characterised by higher labour 
productivity  than  other  employment  outcomes,  this  shift  provides  an  important  impetus  for 
economic growth.  
Despite the change in the structure of employment, female workers are still more dependent on 
agriculture and self-employment activities than male workers. For instance, wage employment 
accounted for one-fifth of female employment and one-third of male employment in the latest 
year.  Tran and Le (1998) and UNDP (1996) report that the downsizing of the SOEs impacted 
more adversely on women than men. Other studies on Vietnam also reveal that women are more   5
likely than men to be employed in the informal sector, largely comprising self-employment and 
agricultural activities (World Bank, 1999). As this sector is generally comprised of lower paid 
jobs, the dependence of women on these two sources of employment suggests they may be 
poorly placed in terms of labour market wage rewards compared to men.  However, this is not 
an issue on which we can inform in this paper given our exclusive emphasis on the wage 
employment sector.   
The average real wage rate has rapidly grown by an average of  12% per annum over the 1993-
2002 period. Other studies on Vietnam’s labour market during the 1990s also reported the rapid 
growth in wages rates. Nga (2002) and Gallup (2002), using data from the first two rounds of 
the household living standard surveys, report a 10% increase in the annual growth rate of hourly 
wages. The increasing wage trend in Vietnam is contrary to what has been found for other 
transitional economies in the earliest phases of their transition to a market economy (Rutkowski, 
1996)   
It is interesting to note that the rapid growth of real average wages in Vietnam is accompanied 
by a continuing improvement of the female position in the labour market over time (table 2). In 
1993, an average female worker earned roughly three-quarters of the average male wage. After 
ten years, the average female earned 88% of the average male wage. The same pattern of change 
in  the  gender  pay  gap  is  also  observed  when  comparing  gender  pay  gaps  across  regions, 
educational attainment levels, and employment sectors over time.  The relative female wage 
position  is  better  in  the  public  than  in  the  private  sector,  which  is  also  reported  for  other 
transitional economies (see Jurajda, 2003 for the case of the Czech Republic; Newell and Reilly, 
2001 for Uzbekistan). There is almost no difference in the earnings levels of those with less than 
upper secondary education and those with tertiary education qualification in the early year of the 
transition.  This  reflects  the  low  return  to  education  widely  observed  in  many  transitional 
economies in the early stages of reform (Newell and Reilly, 1999). The raw returns to education 
appear highest in the later half of the 1998-2002 period. Among these five different levels of 
educational attainment, the mean wage rate of those with tertiary level education has grown 
faster  than  those  with  lower  levels.  Workers  with  tertiary  education  qualifications  earn 
considerably more than those with secondary education levels. In terms of the gender pay gap 
across educational levels, though the female disadvantage slightly widened between 1998 and 
2002, it narrowed over the entire 1993-2002 period. Other studies on Vietnam’s labour market 
have reported a significant difference in mean wages among regions and between the northern 
and southern parts of the country. It is generally observed that the average wage rates in the 
south are much higher than those in the north (Liu, 2004a and Moocks et al., 2002) and this is 
confirmed by the data used here.     6
 
The same pattern of a comparative improvement in the relative female position was also found 
in many transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe such as Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (Newell and Reilly, 2001). Brainerd (2000) also reports six of the 
eight  post-communist  countries  experienced  an  improvement  in  the  female  relative  wage 
position. This pattern is also in line with the empirical evidence reported for the gender pay gap 
in China (Kidd and Meng, 2001; Liu, 1998). 
 
 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
3.1  Decomposition Methodologies  
Following the seminal work of Mincer (1974), it is conventional to specify log wages as a 
function of a set of wage determining characteristics, which primarily includes controls for 
human capital. In the empirical literature on the gender pay gap, the separation of the data points 
by  gender  is  widely  adopted  in  undertaking  gender  pay  gap  decomposition  analysis.  The 
gender-specific earnings equation for the i
th individual is specified as follows: 
m m m m X W m b + = '                                                                                                                     (1) 
f f f f X W m b + = '                                                                                                                     (2)  
where Xj is a (k ´ n) matrix of productivity and other characteristics (e.g., education, labour 
force experience) and j is the gender subscript; b is a (k ´ 1) vector of unknown parameters 
representing the impact of various covariates on the natural log wage (W); m is a (n ´ 1) vector 
of random error terms; and m and f denote male and female sub-samples, respectively.   
The conventional Oaxaca (1973) methodology has been widely used to decompose the average 
gender pay gap between men and women using the OLS estimation of gender-specific wage 
equations. The mean gender difference in log wages is generally given by:   
) ˆ ˆ ( ' ˆ )' ( f m f m f m f m X X X W W b b b - + - = -                                                                             (3) 
where the ‘bars’ denote mean values and ‘hats’ denote the OLS coefficient estimates in this 
case. This allows the overall average differential in wages between the two gender groups to be 
decomposed  into  a  part  attributable  to  differences  in  characteristics  (the  ‘explained’  or 
‘endowment’ effect) and a part attributable to differences in the estimated relationship between   7
men  and  women  (the  ‘unexplained’  or  ‘treatment’  or  ‘residual’  effect).    The  latter  part  of 
expression (3) is sometimes taken to capture the effect of unequal treatment (or discrimination) 
in the labour market.   
The use of this approach is subject to the conventional ‘index number’ problem.  It is clear that 
expression (3) could be re-computed using the ‘basket’ of average male characteristics, which 
potentially yields different numerical values than (3).  Thus:
3 
) ˆ ˆ ( ' ˆ )' ( f m m f f m f m X X X W W b b b - + - = -                                                                             (4) 
The foregoing decompositions are situated within a mean regression framework.  An exclusive 
focus on the mean, however, provides an incomplete account of the gender pay gap.  The 
quantile regression approach allows the gender pay gap to be estimated at particular quantiles of 
the conditional wage distribution as opposed to simply the mean. The estimation of a set of 
conditional quantile functions potentially allows a more detailed portrait of the relationship 
between the conditional distribution of the wage and selected covariates. In contrast to the OLS 
approach, the quantile regression procedure is arguably less sensitive to outliers and provides a 
more  robust  estimator  in  the  face  of  departures  from  normality  than  the  OLS  technique 
(Koenker, 2005; Koenker and Basset, 1978). In addition, according to Deaton (1997), quantile 
regression  models  may  also  have  better  properties  than  the  OLS  ones  in  the  presence  of 
heteroscedasticity. Using this methodology, the log wage equation may be estimated conditional 






th) (see Chamberlain, 1994).      
In the current case, the quantile regression for the male sub-sample can be defined as: 
m m m m X W q q m b + = '                                                                                                                   (5) 
where  m m m m X X W Q q q b ' ) ( =   and  0 ) ( = m m X Q q q m , m q b denotes  the  unknown  male 
parameter vector for the q
th quantile, and q denotes the chosen quantile. Similarly, the quantile 
regression for the female sub-sample can also be defined as: 
f f f f X W q q m b + = '                                               (6) 
with  f f f f X X W Q q q b ' ) ( =  and  0 ) ( = f f X Q q q m  
                                                 
3 Given the linear nature of the components, the computation of sampling variances for the two parts is 
straight-forward.     8
From equations (5) and (6): 
)) ( ( ˆ ))' ( ( ) ( m m m m m m m m W Q W E W Q W X E W Q q q q q q m b = + = =                                           (7) 
and  
)) ( ( ˆ ))' ( ( ) ( f f f f f f f f W Q W E W Q W X E W Q q q q q q m b = + = =                                             (8) 
In these expressions, characteristics are evaluated conditionally at the unconditional quantile log 
wage  value  and  not  unconditionally  as  in  the  case  of  the  mean  regression  approach.  The 
terms )) ( ( m m m W Q W E q q m = and  )) ( ( f f f W Q W E q q m = are thus non-zero. From (7) and (8), 
the gender pay gap at the q
th quantile is defined as Dq and this can be decomposed into three 
parts: 
))] ( ( )) ( ( [
) ˆ ˆ ( ))' ( (
ˆ ))]' ( ( )) ( ( [
f f f m m m
f m f f f
m f f f m m m
W Q W E W Q W E
W Q W X E
W Q W X E W Q W X E
q q q q
q q q




= - = +
- = +
= - = = D
                                                 (9)                                      
This can be re-written more compactly as: 
q q q q q q b b R f m + D W + DW = D ˆ ' ˆ '                                                                                             (10) 
where  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
f m q q q b b b - = D  
f m q q q W - W = DW  where  )) ( ( f f f f W Q W X E q q = = W and  )) ( ( m m m m W Q W X E q q = = W  
))] ( ( )) ( ( [ f f f m m m W Q W E W Q W E R q q q q q m m = - = =  
The  estimates  for  this  procedure  are  also  sensitive  to  the  structure  assumed  under  equal 
treatment and the gender pay gap can thus also be decomposed as: 
q q q q q q b b R m f + D W + DW = D ˆ ' ˆ '                                                                                             (11) 
Using mean characteristics in (10) and (11) may provide unrepresentative realizations for the 
basket of characteristics at points other than the conditional mean wage to which they actually 
relate. Therefore, it is necessary to use realizations for the basket of characteristics that more 
accurately  reflect  the  relevant  points  on  the  conditional  wage  distribution.    The  auxiliary   9
regression-based framework outlined in Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) provides one approach 
that has been used in other studies to obtain the empirical realizations for the characteristics (see 
Hyder and Reilly, 2006). In this paper, however, we use a variation of an approach originally 
suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to derive the characteristics at different quantiles of the 
wage  distribution.  From  each  of  the  male  and  female  sub-samples,  100  observations  are 
randomly drawn with replacement. Each observation once ranked comprises a percentile point 
on the wage distribution. The full set of characteristics for the observation at the q
th wage 
quantile is then retrieved. This process is replicated 200 times to obtain 200 observations at the 
q
th quantile.
4 The mean characteristics of these observations at each quantile are then used to 
construct the realizations for  f m q q W W ,  in equations (10) and (11) above.
5  
In the context of the quantile regression approach, we use a relatively ad hoc method for the 
temporal decomposition of the gender pay gap at selected quantiles. The overall gender pay gap 
at the q
th quantile can be expressed as: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆ ' ˆ ' q q q q q q b b R f m + D W + DW = D                                                                                     (12) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ˆ ' ˆ ' q q q q q q b b R f m + D W + DW = D                                                                                       (13) 
where 0 denotes the early year and 1 the later year. The temporal decomposition of the gender 
pay gap is as follows: 
) ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ˆ ( '
ˆ )' ( ˆ )' (
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q
b b b b
b b
R R f m m
f f m
- + D - D W + - DW +
D W - W + DW - DW = D - D
                                               (14) 
Thus, the overall change in the gender pay gap between two years at the q
th quantile can be 
decomposed into five parts.  The first part is attributable to the temporal change in the gender 
differential  in  realizations  of  observable  characteristics  at  the  q
th  quantile  of  the  wage 
distribution evaluated using male coefficients. The second part is attributable to the temporal 
change in the realizations of the observable female characteristics at the q
th quantile of the wage 
distribution.  The third part is attributable to the temporal change in the male wage structure at 
the q
th quantile of the wage distribution.  The fourth term is attributable to the temporal change 
                                                 
4 These represent more modest numbers of both draws and replications than used by Machado and Mata 
(2005). 
5 The sampling variances for the quantile regression estimates are obtained using bootstrapping with 200 
replications.  Given the linear nature of the ‘treatment’ and ‘endowment’ components in (12) and (13), the 
sampling variances are easily computable, though the use of the bootstrapped variance-covariance may 
not be entirely desirable here for the computation of the sampling variance of a point estimate.      10
in unequal treatment (or wage discrimination) at the q
th quantile of the wage distribution.  The 
final term is unexplained and may be attributable to the changing role of unobservables over 
time. As expression (14) is subject to an ‘index number’ problem, the temporal gender pay gap 
can also be re-cast as: 
) ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ˆ ( '
ˆ )' ( ˆ )' (
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q
b b b b
b b
R R m f f
m m f
- + D - D W + - DW +
D W - W + DW - DW = D - D
                 (15) 
The temporal decomposition suggested by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) could be used to 
decompose the average pay gap over time but this procedure is neither outlined nor pursued 
here in terms of the mean regression analysis.
6                                             
  
3.2  Wage Specification Issues  
The wage regression analysis reported in this study uses hourly real wage rates. The wage rates 
include basic rates and other payments in terms of bonuses, allowances, subsidies in cash and 
kind.
7 This definition of the wage has been widely used in studies on Vietnam such as Glewwe, 
Gragnolati, and Zaman (2001) and Liu (op.cit.). The nominal wage rates are deflated by the 
monthly CPI to yield a real hourly wage rate. The natural logarithms of these real wage rates are 
then used in the augmented Mincerian wage equations, which control for, inter alia, human 
capital,  ethnicity,  industry  affiliation,  and  other  characteristics  (see  table  A1  for  variable 
descriptions and selected summary statistics).  
It  is  customary  to  use  a  years-in-education  variable  in  the  standard  human  capital  wage 
specification. In our case, the schooling years would have to be computed from the information 
on  the  highest  educational  qualifications  obtained  as  reported  in  the  household  surveys. 
However, as demonstrated in other studies, this might introduce noise into the measurement of 
this  particular  variable  (for  instance  Duraisamy,  2002)  and  this  study  thus  uses  a  set  of 
educational dummies to capture human capital effects. In addition, the age of an individual is 
used to proxy for labour market experience rather than using a potential labour force measure as 
                                                 
6 The complete results of this exercise for a variety of comparator years are available on request.  
7 These ‘other payments’ constitute an average share of  9% in the total earnings in general and around 
18% in the rural labour market in the 1993-2002 period.   11
in Liu (2004a). This is acknowledged as a constraint in this application but data limitations 
prevent use of a more accurate measure.
8 
The set of other regressors in the wage equations include worker characteristics (such as marital 
and health status); social exclusion which is proxied by ethnic origin; and ownership type. A set 
of  seven  different  regional  dummies  are  also  included  in  the  wage  regression  models. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue that adjusting the nominal wage rates by the monthly 
price deflator does not fully capture potential seasonal effects. This is particularly the case for 
rural  non-farm  activities,  which  can  be  linked  with  the  harvest  time  during  the  year. 
Consequently, a set of dummies for the interview date are also included to control for potential 
seasonal effects. 
The problem of selectivity bias, as mediated through either participation or selection into wage 
employment,  may  be  an  issue  for  both  the  mean  and  quantile  regression  models.  The 
participation effect may be of less importance given the high participation rates already noted 
for Vietnam for both gender groups.  The wage employment sector selection is clearly more of 
an issue.  The fact that there are more than two possible employment outcomes in the labour 
market (see table 1) suggests use of the Lee (1983) method, which extends the Heckman two-
step procedure to a multiple-outcome model. Following Liu (2004a), the identification of the 
selection effect was explored using household structure variables (i.e., number of children and 
the  dependency  ratio  etc.)  and  non-labour  income.  However,  the  estimated  effects 
corresponding to the selection correction terms were not well determined. There is a suspicion 
that the instruments used may be weak as they were poorly correlated with the probability of 
wage employment and efforts to obtain superior instruments proved futile given the limited 
nature of the data available to us.
9 This outcome, however, is not a complete surprise given the 
fact  that  the  two-step  procedure  has  been  subject  to  criticism  given  its  sensitivity  to 
distributional  assumptions  and  identifying  restrictions  (Manski,  1995).  In  addition,  the 
techniques required to correct for selectivity bias in quantile regression models is less well 
developed though Buchinsky (2001) suggests an approach using the work of Newey (1999). 
Nevertheless, there remain complications that arise in regard to identifying the constant term in 
such wage regression models when higher order terms are used to capture selection as suggested 
                                                 
8 In the VLSS 1992/93 and the VLSS 1997/98, there is information on the experience in the current job. 
However, this information provides an inaccurate measure of the actual labour-force experience because 
the information on experience from the other previous jobs is not reported. In addition, information on 
current job tenure is not reported in the most recent VHLSS 2002. 
9 The additional instruments included educational levels and the occupation of the head of the household 
(which can be argued to capture ‘network’ effects) and household access to land of different quality. The 
use of commune-level characteristics was also explored for the rural samples only, given commune-level 
information is not available for urban communes from the three household surveys used here.     12
by Newey (1999). This is a relatively important issue in any pay gap application (see Hyder and 
Reilly, 2006). Given the difficulties encountered in obtaining plausible instruments to identify 
the selection effects, we do not use a selection correction procedure in this paper in either the 
mean or quantile regression models.  
The econometric specification used in this study is slightly different from that of Liu (2004a) in 
a number of other key respects that go beyond issues relating to the correction for selection bias. 
Firstly, educational levels and the individual’s age are used instead of years in schooling and 
potential experience. This is to avoid the introduction of a possible measurement error in key 
explanatory variables (see above), though it is acknowledged that the use of either age or a 
potential experience measure, as compared to the use of an actual measure, is likely to inflate 
the  magnitude  of  the  unequal  treatment  component  in  the  decompositions  undertaken  here. 
Secondly,  occupation  controls  for  the  wage  employed  workers  are  not  included  in  our 
regression models. This is a judgement call and we take the view that the inclusion of controls 
that may reflect the outcome of a labour market discriminatory process is undesirable in this 
case. In addition, there is also a concern regarding the potential endogeneity of the occupational 
attachment variables. Finally, in contrast to Liu (op.cit.), we also introduce controls for the 
interview date to capture possible seasonality effects and introduce an individual’s health status 
to capture human capital depletion effects. 
   
4.  Empirical Results  
The wage regression estimates, using the mean and the quantile regression models, are provided 
in tables A2 to A7 in the Appendix and are not the subject of detailed discussion here. However, 
it is noteworthy that the fits of the Mincerian equations have improved for both gender groups 
over the time period reviewed here and that the point estimates for the returns to the higher 
formal  human  capital  measures  have  increased  sharply.  This  could  be  taken  to  reflect  the 
enhanced role of the labour market in valuing human capital in Vietnam over the reform period. 
The first rows of table A2 to A4 report ceteris paribus gender pay gaps estimated over the 1993-
2002 period using a pooled wage regression model with a gender intercept term. The estimates 
reflect the improvement in the relative female wage position.  For instance, in 1993 a male wage 
employee earned 31% more than a comparable female, on average and ceteris paribus but by 
1998 the ‘mark-up’ had declined to 19% and exhibited stability thereafter to 2002. The findings 
on the gender pay gap in regard to the two earlier years are in line with other empirical studies 
on the gender pay gap in Vietnam (Nga, 2002; Liu, op.cit.).    13
The first rows of table A2 to A4 also provide the estimated gender effects at different quantiles 
of the conditional wage distribution. These estimates suggest considerable improvements in the 
female relative wage position in the Vietnamese labour market. The gender pay gap tends to 
display  a  modest  decrease  with  movement  across  the  conditional  wage  distribution.  This 
tentatively suggests that gender pay inequality is larger in the low-paid than in the high-paid 
jobs though this is interrogated more closely using the decompositions reported below. The 
decreasing ceteris paribus gender pay gap across the different quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution, however, is in marked contrast to what is commonly observed in other transitional 
economies where a ‘glass-ceiling’ effect is evident at higher points on the conditional wage 
distribution (see Reilly, 1999 and Newell and Reilly, 2001). 
The  separation  of  the  data  points  between  the  male  and  female  sub-samples  is  statistically 
justified on the basis of Wald test values for both the mean and quantile regression models for 
all three years.
10 The estimation of separate wage equations allows for the implementation of the 
various gender pay gap decomposition methodologies both at the mean and selected quantiles. 
In reviewing the estimates reported in tables 3a to 3c, the contraction in the gender pay gap 
between 1993 and the later years is again evident. In all years, the greater part of the gender pay 
gap is attributable to unequal treatment with respect to gender. However, in contrast to the 
results reported in tables A2 to A4, which uses an intercept shift to capture gender, the treatment 
effects appear stable across the selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. This 
finding is invariant to which wage structure is assumed in the absence of unequal treatment.             
There is a substantial contraction in the average gender pay gap over time.  The raw gender pay 
gap contracted by 0.14 log points between 1993 and 2002, which represents almost a halving of 
the gap.
11 The contraction in the gender pay gap over these two years is also evident at selected 
points on the conditional wage distribution, though it is more pronounced at the top rather than 
at the bottom end of the distribution (see tables 4a to 4c). In fact, the change in the overall 
gender  difference  between  1993  and  2002  is  poorly  determined  at  the  10
th  percentile.  The 
quantile gender pay gaps between 1993 and 2002 are decomposed using both expressions (14) 
and  (15).  The  change  in  observable  characteristics  at  the  10
th  percentile  and  changes  in 
observable gender differentials account for most of the con 
                                                 
10 The Wald results are available on request.    
11 This contraction was examined in more detail using the procedure suggested by Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1991). The greatest  part of the reduction is assigned to the  unobservables that improved the 
percentile ranking of the average Vietnamese female in the male residual wage distribution. This may 
reflect the fact that Vietnamese women poorly qualified in terms of both observables and unobservables 
selectively withdrew from wage employment over the time period reviewed here.       14
traction. This suggests that the narrowing gender pay gap at the bottom end of the distribution 
might again be attributable to the selective withdrawal from the Vietnamese labour market of 
the more poorly qualified woman in terms of observable characteristics.  At the top end of the 
wage distribution the gender pay gap contracted by 0.19 log points over these two years with 
changes in observable gender differentials and wage structure exerting an important  narrowing 
role regardless of whether (14) or (15) is used to undertake the decomposition. The change in 
unobservables appears important in explaining the contraction in the gap over time at the 90
th 
percentile. The reduction in unequal treatment of men and women appears an important driver 
for the reduced gender pay gap at the 25
th, the median and 75
th quantiles. Thus, the underlying 
narrative regarding the contraction of the gender pay is sensitive to the selected point on the 
conditional wage distribution.                 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The Doi moi reforms have had a significant impact on the labour market in Vietnam and have 
acted to reduce gender wage disparities in the wage employment sector. The average gender pay 
gap in this sector halved between 1993 and 2002 with most of the reduction achieved by 1998. 
There is thus some evidence that in the last four years the average gap has been characterised by 
a degree of stability.  It is difficult to isolate the factors responsible for this contraction but the 
selective withdrawal from wage employment of poorly qualified Vietnamese women, in terms 
of both observable and unobservable characteristics, is flagged as one possible source for this 
phenomenon (see footnote 11). Hunt (2002) assigned much of the improvement in the relative 
wage position of East German women post-unification to the selective withdrawal from the 
labour  market  of  the  most  poorly  qualified.  However,  although  our  empirical  evidence  is 
consistent with this notion, a definitive inference on this matter would require a more detailed 
analysis of the Vietnamese case than the one offered here.  
A contribution of this paper has been the examination of the degree to which the gender pay gap 
varies across the conditional wage distribution.  The decompositions suggest that, in contrast to 
many transitional economies, the gender pay gap attributable to the treatment effect is relatively 
stable across the conditional wage distribution. In comport with the mean regression findings, 
there  has  also  been  a  contraction  in  the  gender  pay  at  most  selected  points  of  the  wage 
distribution with the observed effect most pronounced at the top end of the distribution. The 
change in unobservables appears important in explaining the contraction in the gap over time at 
the 90
th percentile which is again resonant of our findings for the mean regression. However, the   15
reduction in unequal treatment of men and women only appears an important driver for the 
reduced gender pay gap in the middle part of the conditional wage distribution.                           
We believe our analysis provides an informative portrait of the gender pay gap over time in the 
wage employment sector but this sector only comprised a quarter of those at work in Vietnam 
by 2002.  It should be stressed, therefore, that this study thus offers only a partial insight into the 
effect of the Doi moi reforms on women and the labour market more generally in Vietnam.  The 
sizeable contraction in the gender wage gap among the wage employed is a welcome feature of 
the transformation process.  However, this finding should not be over-emphasized and some 
perspective is clearly required here.  For instance, our analysis did not examine the impact of the 
reform  process  on  other  important  employment  sectors  (e.g.,  the  self-employed  or  those 
employed  in  the  informal  sector)  or  the  implications  for  those  women  discouraged  from 
retaining links with the formal labour market.  The impact of enterprise re-structuring, the re-
shaping of social safety nets and child-care facilities, and the changing demands on female non-
market time may exert more important influences on the quality of women’s lives in Vietnam in 
the near future than the evolution of the gender pay gap in the wage employment sector.  These 
issues clearly merit further investigation in order to more fully document and understand the 
changing position of women in the Vietnamese labour market.      
 
   16
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Table 1: Labour Force Participation and Unemployment 
  1993  1998  2002 
Labour force participation (%)
  82.31  80.51  83.44 
Male participation  84.49  81.56  84.26 
-  Rural  87.28  85.09  86.17 
-  Urban  74.65  73.14  78.07 
Female participation  80.38  79.55  82.64 
-  Rural  82.95  84.72  86.05 
-  Urban  71.58  67.62  72.04 
Unemployment rate (%)  4.39  3.93  8.59 
Male unemployment rate  5.8  5.81  9.77 
-  Rural  3.63  4.03  8.31 
-  Urban  9.62  8.18  12.93 
Female unemployment rate  3.41  2.36  7.55 
-  Rural  2.97  1.94  7.38 
-  Urban  4.3  2.82  7.83 
Structure of employment (%)       
Employment in agriculture
  64.06  54.91  52.45 
-  Male  61.28  51.10  49.30 
-  Female  66.64  58.51  55.57 
Wage employment  17.78  22.92  27.64 
-  Male  22.45  28.45  34.33 
-  Female  13.44  17.69  21.04 
Self-employment and others  18.16  22.18  19.90 
-  Male  16.27  20.46  16.37 
-  Female  19.92  23.81  23.39 
Source: author’s calculations from the VLSS 1992/93; VLSS 1997/98; and VHLSS 2004;  
Notes:  
a.  Labour force consists of those aged from 15 to 60 years old;  
b.  Employment  is  identified  as  having  jobs  over  the  past  7  days  before  the  surveys; 
unemployment is defined as those in the labour force, who was not working over the past 7 
days before the surveys, but was looking for a job;  
c.  Employment outcomes are classified based on primary employment; ‘others’ include those 
who are employed by household businesses and household enterprises. In principles, these 
‘others’ should be included in the category of ‘wage employment’. However, as earning 
data on these ‘others’ were reported as average earning levels of all employees working in 
the respective household businesses (including household members). Thus, these earning 
data are not reliable.  
 
 Table 2: The Structure of Wage and Gender Way Gap, 1993-2002 
  1993  1998  2002 
  Male  Female  F/M ratio  Male  Female  F/M ratio  Male  Female  F/M ratio 
Nominal hourly wage rates  1.9570  1.4810  0.7568  3.2514  2.8493  0.8763  4.2698  3.7629  0.8813 
  (1.097)  (0.909)    (2.198)  (2.212)    (2.963)  (2.783)   
Wage by sector                   
-  Private sector wage  1.9796  1.4184  0.7165  3.1517  2.4796  0.7868  3.6878  3.0366  0.8234 
-  Public sector wage  1.9063  1.5623  0.8195  3.4314  3.3223  0.9682  5.4758  4.7764  0.8723 
Rural vs. urban                   
-  Urban wage  2.0281  1.5148  0.7469  3.8020  3.2130  0.8451  5.2800  4.4854  0.8495 
-  Rural wage  1.9018  1.4409  0.7576  2.7463  2.4040  0.8754  3.5940  3.1525  0.8772 
Mean wages by education levels                   
-  Lower secondary and below  1.9073  1.4949  0.7838  2.9678  2.3573  0.7943  3.4872  2.8798  0.8258 
-  Upper secondary education  2.0815  1.4488  0.6961  3.4535  3.1607  0.9152  4.5288  4.0319  0.8903 
-  Higher education  1.8551  1.4818  0.7988  4.2169  3.8665  0.9169  5.9858  5.1836  0.8660 
Mean wages by regions                   
-  Northern Mountains & Midland  1.4537  0.9756  0.6711  2.5901  2.5271  0.9757  4.2361  4.1997  0.9914 
-  Red River Delta  1.6616  1.2791  0.7698  3.0607  3.0101  0.9835  3.9873  3.6582  0.9175 
-  North Central Coast  1.6014  1.1925  0.7447  2.7194  2.4063  0.8849  3.8449  3.5605  0.9260 
-  South Central Coast  1.6666  1.4101  0.8461  2.7974  2.2986  0.8217  4.1830  3.5604  0.8512 
-  Central Highlands  2.3414  1.4188  0.6060  2.8478  2.7256  0.9571  6.3600  5.5126  0.8668 
-  Southeast  2.4413  1.8275  0.7486  4.2492  3.3726  0.7937  4.5040  3.6758  0.8161 
-  Mekong River Delta  2.1149  1.5275  0.7223  2.9165  2.5215  0.8646  4.0131  3.1849  0.7936 
Source: author’s calculations from the VLSS 1992/93; VLSS 1997/97; and VHLSS 2004;  
Notes:  
a.  hourly wage rate includes all payments in cash and kinds;  
b.  ‘public sector’ also include those who worked in public services sectors;  
c.  ‘lower secondary school and others’ include those with educational attainment level from lower secondary to no education (this grouping is 
justified as there is almost no systematic differences in mean wages of those with these educational levels;  
d.  F/M ratio is the common measure used to summarize the female position in the labour market, which is calculated as the ratio of average 
female hourly pay to its average male counterpart;  
e.  standard deviations of selected continuous variables are in parentheses  20
 
Table 3a: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 2002 
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Mean 
Actual wage gap  0.2453***  0.1934***  0.1538***  0.1093***  0.1097***  0.1503*** 
  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.009) 
Oaxaca-Blinder             
Female characteristics
¦             
Explained effect  -0.0391***  -0.0256***  -0.0402***  -0.0330***  -0.0301***  -0.0241*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Unexplained effect  0.2051***  0.1711***  0.1650***  0.1577***  0.1406***  0.1744*** 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.009) 
Unobservable effect  0.0794  0.0479  0.0289  -0.0154  -0.0008  0.0000 
Male characteristics
§             
Explained effect  -0.0455***  -0.0457***  -0.0565***  -0.0274***  -0.0677***  -0.0346*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Unexplained effect  0.2115***  0.1912***  0.1814***  0.1521***  0.1782***  0.1849*** 
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Unobservable effect  0.0794  0.0479  0.0289  -0.0154  -0.0008  0.0000 
 
Table 3b: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 1998 
  10th  25th  50th  75
th  90th  Mean 
Actual wage gap  0.1971***  0.1480***  0.1461***  0.1159**  0.1551**  0.1474*** 
  (0.038)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.022) 
Oaxaca-Blinder             
Female characteristics
¦             
Explained effect  0.0500***  -0.0133  -0.0493***  -0.0541***  -0.0415**  -0.0162 
  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
Unexplained effect  0.1112**  0.1894***  0.1817***  0.1756***  0.1580***  0.1636*** 
  (0.043)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.022) 
Unobservable effect  0.0359  -0.0280  0.0137  -0.0006  0.0386  0.0000 
Male characteristics
§             
Explained effect  -0.0080  -0.0048  -0.0579***  -0.0652***  -0.0304  -0.0370*** 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.013) 
Unexplained effect  0.1692***  0.1808***  0.1903***  0.1867***  0.1469***  0.1844*** 
  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.017) 
Unobservable effect  0.0359  -0.0280  0.0137  -0.0006  0.0386  0.0000 
 
Table 3c: Decomposition Results at Mean and Quantiles, 1993 
  10th  25th  50th  75
th  90th  Mean 
Actual wage gap  0.3311***  0.3167***  0.2968***  0.3056  0.3031***  0.2897*** 
  (0.080)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.029) 
Oaxaca-Blinder             
Female characteristics
¦             
Explained effect  0.0470  0.0552**  -0.0052  0.0179  -0.0011  0.0273* 
  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Unexplained effect  0.2245***  0.2460***  0.3312***  0.2850***  0.2519***  0.2624*** 
  (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.035)  (0.040)  (0.056)  (0.030) 
Unobservable effect  0.0596  0.0155  -0.0292  0.0027  0.0523  0.0000 
Male characteristics
§             
Explained effect  0.0280  0.0100  -0.0506**  -0.0084  0.0371  -0.0077 
  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.017) 
Unexplained effect  0.2435***  0.2912***  0.3766***  0.3113***  0.2138***  0.2974*** 
  (0.046)  (0.034)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.045)  (0.024) 
Unobservable effect  0.0596  0.0155  -0.0292  0.0027  0.0523  0.0000 
   21
Notes:  
a.  ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level 
of 0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively;  
b.  standard errors are in parentheses; 
c.   
¦: using expression (3) for mean regression model and expression (10) for quantile regression models; 
d. 
§: using expression (4) for for mean regression model and expression (11) for quantile regression models.   22
 
Table 4a: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach, 1993-
2002 
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
Actual changes in differential  -0.0858  -0.1233***  -0.1430***  -0.1962***  -0.1934*** 
  (0.081)  (0.042)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.053) 
Female characteristics
¦¦           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0308*  -0.0341***  -0.0458***  -0.0265**  -0.0566*** 
  (0.016)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  -0.0678***  -0.0473***  0.0156***  0.0492***  0.0612*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Change in Wage Structure  -0.0183  -0.0324***  -0.0238**  -0.0732***  -0.0546*** 
  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  0.0114  -0.0475***  -0.1305***  -0.1008**  -0.0546 
  (0.062)  (0.016)  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.055) 
Change in Unobservables  0.0198  0.0379  0.0415  -0.0450  -0.0887 
Male characteristics
§§           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0628***  -0.0098**  -0.0630***  -0.0983***  -0.1357*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  -0.0358***  -0.0716***  -0.0139***  -0.0330***  0.0072 
  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Change in Wage Structure  -0.0108  -0.0480***  0.0571***  -0.0476***  -0.0856*** 
  (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  0.0038  -0.0784**  -0.1813***  -0.1263***  -0.0428 
  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.031)  (0.044) 




Table 4b: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach, 1993-
1998 
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
Actual changes in differential  -0.1340  -0.1687***  -0.1507***  -0.1897***  -0.1480* 
  (0.088)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.059)  (0.075) 
Female characteristics
¦¦           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0099  0.0335***  -0.0109  -0.0188***  -0.0832*** 
  (0.035)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.015) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  -0.0215  -0.0622***  0.0156***  0.0387***  0.0612** 
  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.029) 
Change in Wage Structure  -0.0428**  -0.0583***  -0.0345***  -0.0649***  -0.0546*** 
  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  -0.1034  -0.0901**  -0.1158***  -0.0800**  -0.0108 
  (0.108)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.058) 
Change in Unobservables  0.0436  0.0085  -0.0051  -0.0647  -0.0607 
Male characteristics
§§           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0620**  0.0351*  0.0445***  0.0371***  0.1502*** 
  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.025) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  0.0306*  -0.0639***  -0.0080  -0.0171  -0.0715* 
  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.039) 
Change in Wage Structure  -0.0413**  -0.0520***  -0.0217*  -0.0565***  -0.1246*** 
  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  -0.1050***  -0.0964***  -0.1330***  -0.0884  0.0047 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.074)  (0.037) 
Change in Unobservables  0.0436  0.0085  -0.0325  -0.0647  -0.1067 
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Table 4c: Temporal Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap: Quantile Regression Approach,    1998-
2002 
 
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90
th 
Actual changes in differential  0.0482  0.0454*  0.0077  -0.0066  -0.0454 
  (0.041)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.059) 
Female characteristics
¦¦           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0280***  -0.0551***  -0.0398***  -0.0017  -0.0365*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.013) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  -0.0169**  -0.0690***  -0.0141***  0.0492***  0.0612*** 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.014) 
Change in Wage Structure  -0.0049  0.0567***  -0.0219***  -0.0149**  -0.0546** 
  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.026) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  0.1218*  0.0368*  -0.0071  -0.0267**  0.0192 
  (0.062)  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.024) 
Change in Unobservables  -0.0238  0.0759  0.0906  -0.0123  -0.0347 
Male characteristics
§§           
Change in Observable Gender Differentials  -0.0234**  -0.0858***  -0.0468***  -0.1347***  -0.2529*** 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.011) 
Change in Observable Characteristics  -0.0214**  -0.0382***  -0.0072**  -0.0038  -0.0167** 
  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Change in Wage Structure  0.0532***  0.0450*  0.0180  0.0083  0.0060 
  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.022) 
Change in Unequal Treatment  0.0638*  0.0486***  -0.0470  -0.0499  0.0480 
  (0.035)  (0.012)  (0.099)  (0.057)  (0.073) 
Change in Unobservables  -0.0238  0.0759  0.0906  0.1736  0.1702 
 
Notes:  
a.  ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.01; 
0.05; and 0.1 respectively;  
b.  standard errors are in parentheses; 
c. 
¦¦: using expression (14) in the text; 
d. 
§§: using expression (15) in the text.   24
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variables  Brief discription  1993 samples  1998 samples  2002 samples 
    Pooled  Male  Female  Pooled  Male  Female  Pooled  Male  Female 
Hourly real wage (ln)  Hourly wage rate adjusted by CPI and regional price index  0.3920  0.5056  0.2159  0.9372  0.9947  0.8498  1.2093  1.2669  1.1165 
    (0.629)  (0.612)  (0.616)  (0.613)  (0.614)  (0.603)  (0.623)  (0.601)  (0.644) 
Married  = 1 if married, 0 otherwise  0.5427  0.5927  0.4651  0.5606  0.6151  0.4776  0.6154  0.6445  0.5684 
Age  Age (years)  30.307  30.589  29.870  32.119  32.660  31.298  32.604  33.091  31.819 
    (10.55)  (10.44)  (10.71)  (10.66)  (10.65)  (10.63)  (10.63)  (10.61)  (10.61) 
Age squared  Age squared (years)  1029.7  1044.6  1006.7  1145.3  1180.1  1092.53  1176.1  1207.68  1125.2 
    (718.5)  (720.6)  (715.1)  (741.1)  (753.8)  (718.5)  (737.3)  (743.9)  (723.7) 
Illiteracy  = 1 if no schooling, 0 otherwise  0.2013  0.1954  0.2105  0.0404  0.0403  0.0406  0.1215  0.1115  0.1378 
Primary education  = 1 having primary education, 0 otherwise  0.2688  0.2872  0.2404  0.2181  0.2123  0.2268  0.2284  0.2415  0.2074 
Lower secondary  = 1 having lower secondary education, 0 otherwise  0.2342  0.2404  0.2248  0.3521  0.3707  0.3237  0.2400  0.2674  0.1958 
Upper secondary  = 1 having upper secondary education, 0 otherwise  0.0926  0.0862  0.1024  0.1977  0.1976  0.1978  0.1282  0.1245  0.1343 
Higher education  = 1 having higher education, 0 otherwise  0.2030  0.1908  0.2219  0.1918  0.1791  0.2111  0.2818  0.2552  0.3247 
Health  = 1 if having a treatment at hospital over the past 4 week  0.0284  0.0220  0.0384  0.0407  0.0305  0.0563  0.0395  0.0341  0.0482 
Kinh  = 1 if belonging in the Kinh majority  0.8929  0.8807  0.9118  0.9018  0.9020  0.9015  0.9389  0.9433  0.9319 
Private  = 1 if being employed in the public sector  0.6414  0.6908  0.5647  0.6108  0.6434  0.5613  0.4922  0.5213  0.4453 
Public  = 1 if being employed in the private sector  0.3586  0.3092  0.4353  0.3892  0.3566  0.4387  0.3518  0.4787  0.5547 
Urban  = 1 if living in urban areas  0.4785  0.4367  0.5434  0.5071  0.4785  0.5505  0.4227  0.4008  0.4579 
North Mountains & Midland  = 1 if residing in North Mountains & Midland  0.0937  0.0862  0.1053  0.0650  0.0637  0.0671  0.1169  0.1178  0.1154 
Red River Delta  = 1 if residing in Red River Delta  0.1907  0.1991  0.1778  0.1754  0.1867  0.1581  0.2328  0.2450  0.2131 
North Central Coast  = 1 if residing in North Central Coast  0.0597  0.0642  0.0526  0.0929  0.0969  0.0869  0.0801  0.0882  0.0669 
South Central Coast  = 1 if residing in South Central Coast  0.1255  0.1358  0.1095  0.1484  0.1595  0.1316  0.1454  0.1542  0.1312 
Central Highlands  = 1 if residing in Central Highlands  0.0106  0.0128  0.0071  0.0164  0.0136  0.0207  0.0815  0.0739  0.0937 
Southeast  = 1 if residing in Southeast  0.2632  0.2459  0.2902  0.2995  0.2760  0.3353  0.1180  0.1059  0.1375 
Mekong River Delta  = 1 if residing in Mekong River Delta  0.2566  0.2560  0.2575  0.2023  0.2036  0.2003  0.2254  0.2150  0.2422 
Quarter 1  = 1 if interviewed in 1
st quarter  0.1573  0.1367  0.1892  0.2624  0.2510  0.2798  0.2436  0.2426  0.2453 
Quarter 2  = 1 if interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.2811  0.2899  0.2674  0.3008  0.2999  0.3022  0.2677  0.2656  0.2711 
Quarter 3  = 1 if interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.2225  0.2358  0.2020  0.2811  0.2858  0.2740  0.2536  0.2506  0.2584 
Quarter 4  = 1 if interviewed in 4
th quarter  0.3391  0.3376  0.3414  0.1557  0.1633  0.1440  0.2351  0.2412  0.2252 
Number of observations    1793  1090  703  3045  1837  1208  17063  10531  6532 
Notes: These mean figures are computed without controlling for any characteristics; standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses.  25
Table A2: Pooled Regression Model, 1993 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Male  0.2774**  0.3125***  0.3157****  0.3060***  0.2990***  0.2814*** 
  (0.029)  (0.048)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.053) 
Married  -0.0828**  -0.0656  -0.0721  -0.0517  -0.1565***  -0.1327** 
  (0.035)  (0.075)  (0.056)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.061) 
Age  0.0313***  0.0577***  0.0330***  0.0180*  0.0160*  0.0094 
  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.0004***  -0.0008***  -0.0005***  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0200  0.0053  -0.0455  0.0505  0.0518  0.0870 
  (0.044)  (0.081)  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.064) 
Lower secondary  0.0279  0.0082  0.0408  0.0972**  0.0417  0.0886 
  (0.048)  (0.094)  (0.065)  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.077) 
Upper secondary  0.0694  0.0682  0.0743  0.1244**  0.0745  0.1851* 
  (0.059)  (0.112)  (0.094)  (0.064)  (0.080)  (0.103) 
Higher education  0.0638  0.1332  0.0972  0.0764  0.0178  0.0709 
  (0.057)  (0.107)  (0.070)  (0.057)  (0.073)  (0.099) 
Health  -0.0588  -0.0767  -0.1175  -0.0169  -0.0613  -0.0422 
  (0.074)  (0.180)  (0.077)  (0.086)  (0.085)  (0.131) 
Kinh  0.0104  0.0461  0.0934**  0.0245  0.0074  0.0278 
  (0.048)  (0.120)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.081) 
Private  0.0742**  0.1214*  0.1038*  0.0102  -0.0065  0.0274 
  (0.039)  (0.072)  (0.059)  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.062) 
Urban   0.0471**  0.1341**  0.0280  0.0428**  0.0388  0.0722 
  (0.023)  (0.064)  (0.042)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.055) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.5818***  -0.6725***  -0.7831***  -0.7297***  -0.4883***  -0.3436*** 
  (0.056)  (0.086)  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.069)  (0.131) 
Red River Delta  -0.5018***  -0.7225***  -0.5585***  -0.5571***  -0.3774***  -0.3502*** 
  (0.045)  (0.087)  (0.064)  (0.056)  (0.060)  (0.092) 
North Central Coast  -0.4967***  -0.7544***  -0.4770***  -0.4638***  -0.4631***  -0.3646*** 
  (0.064)  (0.163)  (0.085)  (0.073)  (0.061)  (0.139) 
South Central Coast  -0.4569***  -0.5527***  -0.5032***  -0.5421***  -0.4035***  -0.3282*** 
  (0.048)  (0.100)  (0.064)  (0.056)  (0.069)  (0.085) 
Central Highlands  -0.1689*  -0.1687  -0.2932**  -0.1968  -0.0765  -0.1601 
  (0.095)  (0.166)  (0.152)  (0.180)  (0.137)  (0.111) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.2343***  -0.4082***  -0.2884***  -0.2240***  -0.1287***  -0.1242* 
  (0.042)  (0.088)  (0.054)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.072) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  0.0353  0.0963  0.0213  0.0976*  0.0036  0.0206 
  (0.043)  (0.074)  (0.069)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.077) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0210  0.0305  0.0276  0.0219  0.0200  0.0138 
  (0.035)  (0.077)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.062) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0249  0.0432  0.0318  0.0258  0.0163  0.0197 
  (0.043)  (0.075)  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.057)  (0.072) 
constant  -0.2498  -1.3289***  -0.4906**  0.0177  0.2694*  0.6616*** 
  (0.161)  (0.343)  (0.206)  (0.195)  (0.152)  (0.191) 
R
2  0.2014  0.1416  0.1491  0.1372  0.1242  0.0868 
Number of observation  1793  1793  1793  1793  1793  1793 
Notes:  
a.  ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 
0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively.  
b.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile 
regression model estimates are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications.  26
Table A3: Pooled Regression Model, 1998 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Male  0.1711***  0.2193***  0.1823***  0.1622***  0.1257***  0.1446*** 
  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.046) 
Married  -0.0140  -0.0206  -0.0377  -0.0118  0.0268  -0.0234 
  (0.027)  (0.055)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.048) 
Age  0.0363***  0.0494***  0.0513***  0.0261***  0.0081  0.0226** 
  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Age squared  -0.0004***  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0003**  0.0000  -0.0002 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0105  -0.0167  0.0179  0.0196  0.0401  0.0542 
  (0.053)  (0.083)  (0.061)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.073) 
Lower secondary  0.0494  0.0042  0.0231  0.0644  0.1239**  0.1386* 
  (0.054)  (0.089)  (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.076) 
Upper secondary  0.2039***  0.1486*  0.1331*  0.1930***  0.2565***  0.3149*** 
  (0.059)  (0.089)  (0.074)  (0.059)  (0.066)  (0.095) 
Higher education  0.3868***  0.2730***  0.2726***  0.3702***  0.4941***  0.5830*** 
  (0.061)  (0.090)  (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.072)  (0.093) 
Health  -0.0202  -0.1380  -0.0930*  -0.0066  -0.0396  0.0225 
  (0.051)  (0.124)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.060)  (0.106) 
Kinh   0.0397  0.0145  0.0790*  0.0283  0.0310  0.0248 
  (0.036)  (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.064) 
Private  0.0538**  0.0930**  0.0720**  0.0002  0.0210  0.0466 
  (0.028)  (0.043)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.050) 
Urban  0.1077***  0.0315  0.0386  0.0746**  0.1062***  0.1654*** 
  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.052) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.3813***  -0.3926***  -0.3731***  -0.3574***  -0.4715***  -0.3137*** 
  (0.042)  (0.073)  (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.059)  (0.085) 
Red River Delta  -0.3893***  -0.5562***  -0.4293***  -0.3707***  -0.3321***  -0.2462*** 
  (0.035)  (0.070)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
North Central Coast  -0.4488***  -0.5409***  -0.4207***  -0.4647***  -0.4531***  -0.3696*** 
  (0.042)  (0.071)  (0.061)  (0.041)  (0.055)  (0.081) 
South Central Coast  -0.3314***  -0.2559***  -0.2886***  -0.3154***  -0.3624***  -0.3824*** 
  (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.051) 
Central Highlands  -0.1754**  0.0213  -0.1117  -0.1416***  -0.3019***  -0.3133** 
  (0.077)  (0.230)  (0.088)  (0.054)  (0.068)  (0.139) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.2462***  -0.2002***  -0.2551***  -0.2371***  -0.2588***  -0.2568*** 
  (0.030)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.053) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  -0.0077  -0.0683  -0.0670  -0.0224  0.0273  0.0342 
  (0.035)  (0.065)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.059) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0228  0.0160  -0.0202  0.0142  0.0327  0.0310 
  (0.033)  (0.065)  (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.051) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0049  0.0477  0.0356  0.0176  0.0544  0.0284 
  (0.034)  (0.069)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.051) 
constant  0.1298  -0.5157**  0.3307*  0.3525**  0.7901***  0.7750*** 
  (0.135)  (0.244)  (0.177)  (0.169)  (0.158)  (0.202) 
R
2  0.1798  0.0843  0.0821  0.1044  0.1360  0.1598 
Number of observation  3044  3044  3044  3044  3044  3044 
Notes: see Table A2 
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Table A4: Pooled Regression Model, 2002 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Male  0.1783***  0.2026***  0.1940***  0.1643***  0.1354***  0.1279*** 
  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
Married  -0.0703***  -0.0754***  -0.0780***  -0.0664***  -0.0494***  -0.0756** 
  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
Age  0.0365***  0.0613***  0.0417***  0.0305***  0.0280***  0.0201*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Age squared  -0.0004***  -0.0008***  -0.0005***  -0.0003***  -0.0003***  -0.0002* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0782***  0.1356***  0.1092***  0.0800***  0.0593***  0.0575*** 
  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Lower secondary  0.1074***  0.1645***  0.1456***  0.1128***  0.0911***  0.0627** 
  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.026) 
Upper secondary  0.2882***  0.2711***  0.2662***  0.2655***  0.2959***  0.3530*** 
  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.036) 
Higher education  0.5304***  0.5043***  0.5243***  0.5342***  0.5547***  0.5645*** 
  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.028) 
Health  -0.0581***  -0.0194  -0.0630**  -0.0653***  -0.0607***  0.0919** 
  (0.023)  (0.048)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.042) 
Kinh   0.0979***  0.1147**  0.0393*  0.0713***  0.0730***  0.1102*** 
  (0.020)  (0.047)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.030) 
Private  0.0498***  0.1328***  0.0921***  0.0260**  0.0026  0.0023 
  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
Urban    0.1074***  0.1025***  0.1025***  0.0758***  0.0970***  0.1578*** 
  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.019) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.1621***  -0.1767***  -0.1627***  -0.1914***  -0.1925***  -0.1844*** 
  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.032) 
Red River Delta  -0.1879***  -0.2222***  -0.1825***  -0.2183***  -0.2088***  -0.1753*** 
  (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
North Central Coast  -0.2325***  -0.2697***  -0.2434***  -0.2662***  -0.2346***  -0.1708*** 
  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.041) 
South Central Coast  -0.0791***  -0.0683**  -0.0447**  -0.1086***  -0.1230**  -0.1170*** 
  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.026) 
Central Highlands  0.1761***  0.0333  0.1441***  0.1830***  0.2454***  0.2988 
  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.032) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.0632***  -0.1263***  -0.0577***  -0.0870***  -0.0545***  0.0091 
  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  -0.0367***  -0.0536**  -0.0524***  -0.0516***  -0.0282**  0.0137 
  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.022) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0097  0.0110  -0.0108  -0.0037  0.0028  0.0303 
  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0284**  0.0415  0.0413  0.0281  0.0006  0.0311 
  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
constant  0.0378  -0.5012***  -0.3196***  0.2230***  0.5552***  0.8659*** 
  (0.056)  (0.103)  (0.064)  (0.055)  (0.064)  (0.097) 
R
2  0.2419  0.0991  0.1157  0.1515  0.1735  0.1724 
Number of observation  17063  17063  17063  17063  17063  17063 
Notes: see Table A2 
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Table A5: Male and Female Regression Models, 1993 
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Married  -0.1151***  -0.1482*  -0.1522**  -0.0450  -0.1422**  -0.1462**  -0.0590  -0.0134  -0.0251  -0.0308  -0.0506  -0.1442 
  (0.052)  (0.090)  (0.076)  (0.055)  (0.065)  (0.077)  (0.051)  (0.084)  (0.068)  (0.057)  (0.075)  (0.104) 
Age  0.0335***  0.0748***  0.0334**  0.0241  0.0110  0.0023  0.0248*  0.0905***  0.0230  0.0157  0.0305*  0.0122 
  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.025) 
Age squared  -0.0005**  -0.0012***  -0.0005**  -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0003*  -0.0012***  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0003 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0632  0.0078  -0.0489  0.1065*  0.0738  0.1583*  0.0605  0.0031  -0.0914  -0.0366  0.0007  -0.0364 
  (0.055)  (0.124)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.085)  (0.068)  (0.131)  (0.102)  (0.073)  (0.081)  (0.135) 
Lower secondary  0.0305  0.0739  0.0271  0.1129*  0.0517  0.0866  0.0135  0.0079  0.0621  0.0190  0.0440  0.1716 
  (0.060)  (0.144)  (0.078)  (0.062)  (0.069)  (0.086)  (0.078)  (0.151)  (0.123)  (0.070)  (0.096)  (0.144) 
Upper secondary  0.1109  0.0698  0.0357  0.1221*  0.1539  0.2031*  0.0254  0.0754  0.0642  0.0133  0.0960  0.1175 
  (0.076)  (0.176)  (0.118)  (0.076)  (0.111)  (0.119)  (0.095)  (0.158)  (0.131)  (0.108)  (0.120)  (0.191) 
Higher education  0.1080  0.0997  0.1282  0.1406*  0.0842  0.0921  0.0113  0.1267  0.1487  0.1891  0.0007  0.0532 
  (0.076)  (0.180)  (0.097)  (0.076)  (0.105)  (0.120)  (0.086)  (0.159)  (0.128)  (0.097)  (0.116)  (0.144) 
Health  -0.0073  -0.0577  0.0925  -0.0082  -0.0846  -0.0559  -0.0632  -0.1134  -0.2051  -0.0772  -0.0069  -0.0231 
  (0.109)  (0.270)  (0.142)  (0.126)  (0.165)  (0.146)  (0.095)  (0.193)  (0.129)  (0.135)  (0.136)  (0.178) 
Kinh   0.0362  0.0915  -0.0434  -0.0592  0.0195  0.0966  0.1099  0.0859  0.0727  0.1186  0.0326  0.3198** 
  (0.060)  (0.154)  (0.063)  (0.057)  (0.066)  (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.131)  (0.122)  (0.089)  (0.134)  (0.155) 
Private   0.1925***  0.2353**  0.2647***  0.1272**  0.0776  0.0321  -0.1135**  -0.0630  -0.1556*  -0.1727***  -0.1320*  -0.0866 
  (0.054)  (0.117)  (0.076)  (0.050)  (0.076)  (0.081)  (0.053)  (0.102)  (0.087)  (0.058)  (0.074)  (0.084) 
Urban   0.0811**  0.2322***  0.0459  0.0558  0.0351  0.0662  0.0052  0.0296  0.1613**  0.0881  0.0776  0.0585 
  (0.043)  (0.083)  (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.101)  (0.077)  (0.062)  (0.073)  (0.106) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.5131***  -0.6285***  -0.6857***  -0.6394***  -0.4191***  -0.3788***  -0.6647***  -0.6609***  -0.8629***  -0.7676***  -0.5817***  -0.4728** 
  (0.078)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.107)  (0.091)  (0.141)  (0.082)  (0.110)  (0.101)  (0.119)  (0.129)  (0.223) 
Red River Delta  -0.4667***  -0.5914***  -0.4621***  -0.5440***  -0.3857***  -0.3384***  -0.5684***  -0.9104***  -0.7240***  -0.4995***  -0.3981***  -0.2981** 
  (0.059)  (0.112)  (0.087)  (0.068)  (0.085)  (0.092)  (0.073)  (0.126)  (0.119)  (0.102)  (0.090)  (0.143) 
North Central Coast  -0.4728***  -0.4991**  -0.4193***  -0.4816***  -0.4663***  -0.5438***  -0.5475***  -0.8386***  -0.5850***  -0.5330***  -0.3845***  -0.4063** 
  (0.085)  (0.213)  (0.090)  (0.089)  (0.073)  (0.182)  (0.099)  (0.171)  (0.202)  (0.139)  (0.117)  (0.181) 
South Central Coast  -0.4565***  -0.6384***  -0.4438***  -0.5298  -0.4311***  -0.3151***  -0.4414***  -0.5845***  -0.4568***  -0.5499***  -0.2910**  -0.1093 
  (0.060)  (0.128)  (0.081)  (0.075)  (0.084)  (0.099)  (0.082)  (0.170)  (0.095)  (0.084)  (0.133)  (0.168) 
Central Highlands  -0.0981  0.1353  -0.1930  -0.1659  -0.0853  -0.1919  -0.3484  -0.4069  -0.6225  -0.4162  -0.1104  0.0321   29
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
  (0.095)  (0.140)  (0.136)  (0.163)  (0.158)  (0.151)  (0.229)  (0.327)  (0.402)  (0.398)  (0.397)  (0.451) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.1972***  -0.3842***  -0.2220***  -0.2182***  -0.1236**  -0.1125*  -0.3016***  -0.4494***  -0.3410***  -0.2743***  -0.1576*  -0.1866* 
  (0.054)  (0.124)  (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.113)  (0.093)  (0.066)  (0.100)  (0.118) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  0.0319  -0.0667  0.1202  0.0704  0.0271  0.1270*  0.0355  0.0599  0.0775  0.0671  0.0147  -0.1273 
  (0.061)  (0.151)  (0.103)  (0.070)  (0.084)  (0.075)  (0.062)  (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.088)  (0.078)  (0.135) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0231  0.0330  0.0278  0.0197  0.0216  0.0172  0.0151  0.1488  0.0181  0.0192  0.0146  0.0591 
  (0.043)  (0.087)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.065)  (0.060)  (0.111)  (0.091)  (0.067)  (0.078)  (0.113) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0215  0.0320  0.0247  0.0215  0.0166  0.0202  0.0333  0.0499  0.0390  0.0310  0.0254  0.0276 
  (0.053)  (0.137)  (0.079)  (0.065)  (0.073)  (0.086)  (0.070)  (0.119)  (0.100)  (0.075)  (0.093)  (0.138) 
constant  -0.2106  -1.4328***  -0.4461*  0.1289  0.5274**  0.8888***  0.1708  -1.6742***  -0.0597  0.4047  0.2373  1.1259** 
  (0.233)  (0.454)  (0.276)  (0.282)  (0.233)  (0.249)  (0.223)  (0.503)  (0.329)  (0.280)  (0.321)  (0.444) 
R
2 or Pseudo R
2  0.1643  0.1380  0.1224  0.1134  0.1003  0.0785  0.1877  0.1689  0.1468  0.1321  0.0995  0.0791 
Number of observation  1090  1090  1090  1090  1090  1090  703  703  703  703  703  703 
Notes:  
a.  ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.01; 0.05; and 0.1 respectively.  
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Table A6: Male and Female Regression Models, 1998 
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Married  -0.0038  -0.0472  -0.0350  -0.0263  -0.0398  -0.0171  -0.0040  -0.0885  -0.0695  -0.0258  -0.0070  -0.0364 
  (0.037)  (0.070)  (0.047)  (0.038)  (0.049)  (0.060)  (0.038)  (0.062)  (0.050)  (0.043)  (0.060)  (0.078) 
Age  0.0358***  0.0695***  0.0519***  0.0295***  0.0093  0.0236*  0.0158  0.0252  0.0265**  0.0170  -0.0078  -0.0132 
  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Age squared  -0.0004***  -0.0010***  -0.0007***  -0.0004**  0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0002  0.0003  0.0004* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0195  0.0410  0.0047  0.0041  0.0155  0.0244  0.0985*  0.0180  0.0645  0.0531  0.1465*  0.2985*** 
  (0.069)  (0.280)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.060)  (0.104)  (0.062)  (0.127)  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.098) 
Lower secondary  0.0320  0.0181  0.0476  0.0212  0.1094  0.1987*  0.1486**  0.0392  0.1080  0.1239  0.1983**  0.2919*** 
  (0.070)  (0.277)  (0.070)  (0.076)  (0.075)  (0.115)  (0.064)  (0.115)  (0.092)  (0.084)  (0.079)  (0.110) 
Upper secondary  0.1725**  0.1269  0.1512**  0.1570*  0.2162**  0.3003**  0.3017***  0.1207  0.2077**  0.2713***  0.4010***  0.6451*** 
  (0.075)  (0.274)  (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.126)  (0.076)  (0.133)  (0.100)  (0.094)  (0.109)  (0.131) 
Higher education  0.3563***  0.2289  0.2917***  0.2824***  0.4905***  0.6043**  0.4709***  0.3415  0.3853***  0.4543  0.5681***  0.8801*** 
  (0.079)  (0.287)  (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.098)  (0.126)  (0.079)  (0.135)  (0.107)  (0.094)  (0.102)  (0.156) 
Health  -0.0285  -0.0298  -0.1264**  -0.0941  -0.1032  -0.0415  -0.0036  -0.0640  -0.0444  -0.0783  -0.0408  -0.0012 
  (0.072)  (0.163)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.093)  (0.144)  (0.063)  (0.155)  (0.095)  (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.107) 
Kinh   0.0619  0.0237  0.0418  0.1048**  0.1064**  0.0289  0.0373  0.0199  0.0502  0.0333  0.1299*  0.1667* 
  (0.044)  (0.082)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.078)  (0.057)  (0.077)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.071)  (0.095) 
Private  0.1902***  0.2717**  0.2499***  0.1393***  0.1044**  0.1746***  -0.1562***  -0.1482**  -0.1859***  -0.1513***  -0.1119**  -0.0452 
  (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.060)  (0.042)  (0.063)  (0.053)  (0.045)  (0.053)  (0.078) 
Urban   0.1549***  0.0138  0.0772**  0.1272***  0.1479***  0.2645***  0.0514  0.0031  0.0291  0.0021  0.0118  0.1171* 
  (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.064)  (0.036)  (0.062)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.052)  (0.064) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.4110***  -0.4037***  -0.4309***  -0.4193***  -0.4953***  -0.3865***  -0.3745***  -0.2948**  -0.3914***  -0.3591***  -0.3650***  -0.3858*** 
  (0.056)  (0.089)  (0.068)  (0.077)  (0.069)  (0.084)  (0.063)  (0.116)  (0.095)  (0.064)  (0.126)  (0.120) 
Red River Delta  -0.4076***  -0.5431***  -0.4585***  -0.3674***  -0.3674***  -0.2869***  -0.3730***  -0.5613***  -0.3909***  -0.3331***  -0.3206***  -0.1871 
  (0.043)  (0.085)  (0.063)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.131)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.090)  (0.126) 
North Central Coast  -0.4884***  -0.6937***  -0.4983***  -0.5224***  -0.4750***  -0.3329***  -0.4254***  -0.4076***  -0.4101***  -0.4183***  -0.5086***  -0.4088** 
  (0.055)  (0.096)  (0.064)  (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.095)  (0.062)  (0.108)  (0.086)  (0.056)  (0.091)  (0.165) 
South Central Coast  -0.3583***  -0.3034***  -0.3106***  -0.3265***  -0.3971***  -0.4139***  -0.3171***  -0.2140***  -0.3033***  -0.3421***  -0.3395***  -0.4031*** 
  (0.039)  (0.074)  (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.053)  (0.066)  (0.047)  (0.072)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.078) 
Central Highlands  -0.3901***  -0.4844  -0.1594  -0.2929***  -0.3934***  -0.4279***  -0.0893  0.1639  0.0129  -0.1314*  -0.2265**  -0.3538***   31
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
  (0.101)  (0.312)  (0.158)  (0.089)  (0.095)  (0.114)  (0.071)  (0.151)  (0.098)  (0.078)  (0.106)  (0.127) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.2716***  -0.2372***  -0.2480***  -0.2496***  -0.2618***  -0.2853***  -0.2336***  -0.1108*  -0.2131***  -0.2541***  -0.3209***  -0.2856*** 
  (0.038)  (0.063)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.072)  (0.044)  (0.068)  (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.057)  (0.081) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  0.0532  0.1640**  0.0783*  0.0365  0.0618  -0.0057  -0.0037  0.0064  0.0163  -0.0010  -0.0615  -0.0229 
  (0.037)  (0.076)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.065)  (0.040)  (0.062)  (0.057)  (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.079) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0157  0.1284  0.0745  0.0544  0.0295  -0.0717  0.0195  -0.0842  -0.0350  0.0831  0.0344  0.1220 
  (0.038)  (0.086)  (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.068)  (0.043)  (0.072)  (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.079) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0223  0.1112  0.0878*  0.0279  -0.0068  -0.0591  -0.0098  -0.0386  -0.0057  0.0067  0.0033  0.0440 
  (0.044)  (0.094)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.079)  (0.057)  (0.093)  (0.067)  (0.071)  (0.074)  (0.099) 
constant  0.2139  -0.8223*  -0.3305*  0.3446*  0.9122***  0.9086***  0.5369***  -0.0816  0.1315  0.5906***  1.1966***  1.2660*** 
  (0.183)  (0.428)  (0.201)  (0.212)  (0.219)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.371)  (0.245)  (0.222)  (0.283)  (0.280) 
R
2 or Pseudo R
2  0.1780  0.1023  0.0857  0.0956  0.1399  0.1669  0.2175  0.1097  0.1003  0.1258  0.1469  0.1932 
Number of observation  1848  1848  1848  1848  1848  1848  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210 
Notes: see Table A5 
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Table A7: Male and Female Regression Models, 2002 
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Married  -0.0555***  -0.0826***  -0.0804***  -0.0551***  -0.0443***  -0.0560*  -0.0812***  -0.0625*  -0.0688***  -0.0747***  -0.0752***  -0.0936*** 
  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.018)  (0.038)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.030) 
Age  0.0423***  0.0606***  0.0467***  0.0332***  0.0314***  0.0238***  0.0266***  0.0502***  0.0305***  0.0200***  0.0188***  0.0186** 
  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Age squared  -0.0005***  -0.0008***  -0.0006***  -0.0003***  -0.0003***  -0.0002**  -0.0003***  -0.0007***  -0.0003***  -0.0002*  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary education  0.0648***  0.1146***  0.0938***  0.0595***  0.0485**  0.0532  0.0892***  0.1425***  0.0980***  0.0913***  0.0926***  0.0491 
  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.025)  (0.050)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.033) 
Lower secondary  0.0734***  0.1258***  0.1109***  0.0835***  0.0653***  0.0237  0.1566***  0.1912***  0.1580***  0.1463***  0.1573***  0.1248*** 
  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.027)  (0.050)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.040) 
Upper secondary  0.2319***  0.1997***  0.2031***  0.2022***  0.2556***  0.3218***  0.3742***  0.3494***  0.3244***  0.3472***  0.3938***  0.3712*** 
  (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.045)  (0.031)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.040)  (0.041) 
Higher education  0.4787***  0.4469***  0.4707***  0.4757***  0.5140***  0.5156***  0.6012***  0.5363***  0.5783***  0.6066***  0.6280***  0.6132*** 
  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.029)  (0.054)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
Health  -0.0575**  -0.0176  -0.0418  -0.0656*  -0.0555**  -0.0991*  -0.0597*  -0.0501  -0.0559  -0.0711**  -0.0687*  -0.0785 
  (0.030)  (0.053)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.059)  (0.035)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.056) 
Kinh   0.1297***  0.1239**  0.0698***  0.0950***  0.1347***  0.1784***  0.0550*  0.0503  0.0060  0.0305  0.0039  0.0148 
  (0.026)  (0.054)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.087)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.048) 
Private  0.1052***  0.1955***  0.1722***  0.0731***  0.0276  0.0348  -0.0161  -0.0172  -0.0216  -0.0089  -0.0255  -0.0550* 
  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.040)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.030) 
Urban   0.1697***  0.1561***  0.1735***  0.1496***  0.1543***  0.2188***  0.0356**  0.0076  0.0004  0.0057  0.0435**  0.1054*** 
  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.043)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.026) 
North Mounts. & Midland  -0.1783***  -0.1875***  -0.2213***  -0.2336***  -0.1824***  -0.1770***  -0.1385***  -0.0704  -0.1067***  -0.1422***  -0.2289***  -0.2333*** 
  (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.046)  (0.030)  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.052) 
Red River Delta  -0.1840***  -0.1975***  -0.1965***  -0.2266***  -0.1950***  -0.1680***  -0.2023  -0.2508***  -0.2294***  -0.2266***  -0.2385***  -0.1686*** 
  (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.037)  (0.025)  (0.058)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.036) 
North Central Coast  -0.2176***  -0.2427***  -0.2522***  -0.2655***  -0.2003***  -0.1418***  -0.2708***  -0.3127***  -0.2926***  -0.2881***  -0.2847***  -0.2191*** 
  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.051)  (0.033)  (0.078)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.058) 
South Central Coast  -0.0756***  -0.0589*  -0.0713**  -0.1089***  -0.0882***  -0.0866**  -0.0927***  -0.0297  -0.0613**  -0.1218***  -0.1641***  -0.1297*** 
  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.050)  (0.031)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.041) 
Central Highlands  0.1504***  0.0329  0.0964***  0.1495***  0.2278***  0.2726***  0.2059***  0.0569  0.1294***  0.2272***  0.2661***  0.3104***   33
  MALE SAMPLE  FEMALE SAMPLE 
  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90  Mean  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
  (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.058)  (0.033)  (0.078)  (0.049)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.041) 
Mekong River Delta  -0.0626***  -0.1460***  -0.0838***  -0.0841***  -0.0219  0.0192  -0.0558**  -0.0587  -0.0539**  -0.1019***  -0.0867***  0.0244 
  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.046)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.036) 
Interviewed in 1
st quarter  -0.0356**  -0.0563  -0.0309  -0.0504***  -0.0234  0.0406  -0.0322  -0.0330  -0.0346  -0.0548***  -0.0372  -0.0144 
  (0.015)  (0.047)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.036) 
Interviewed in 2
nd quarter  0.0175  0.0200  0.0073  0.0064  0.0146  0.0288  -0.0014  0.0149  -0.0132  -0.0307  -0.0227  0.0265 
  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.038) 
Interviewed in 3
rd quarter  0.0165  0.0318  0.0252  0.0198  0.0026  0.0104  0.0516  0.0126  0.0440  0.0353  0.0178  0.0477 
  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.035) 
constant  0.0661  -0.8324***  -0.2588***  0.3044***  0.5855***  0.8873***  0.2487***  -0.6975***  -0.0207  0.4317***  0.7600***  1.0037*** 
  (0.073)  (0.135)  (0.089)  (0.070)  (0.084)  (0.140)  (0.091)  (0.177)  (0.134)  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.147) 
R
2 or Pseudo R
2  0.2278  0.0887  0.1024  0.1400  0.1680  0.1662  0.2476  0.0919  0.1212  0.1632  0.1818  0.1820 
Number of observation  10531  10531  10531  10531  10531  10531  6532  6532  6532  6532  6532  6532 
Notes: see Table  34
 